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Abstract
The one time shock of the Great Recession in 2008/9 opens up the opportunity to 
study the sensitivity of countries to global economic shocks. Some countries are more 
resilient to global shocks than others. The authors analyze the link between the coun-
try response to the Great Recession and participation in global supply chains. Their 
preferred measure of supply chains is the Grubel–Lloyd index, which enables us to 
use detailed trade data over longer periods of time. The main finding is that strong 
involvement in global supply chains slows down the recovery of countries to reces-
sions. Europe, which is heavily involved in global supply chains, is a case in point.
Keywords Great Recession · Supply chains · Heterogeneous country responses
JEL Classification E32 · F14 · F44
1 Introduction
Shocks affect countries differently. Some countries are hit particularly hard by a 
shock, and others are not. For natural disasters this is hardly surprising, as these 
are often country-specific, but why macro-economic, or economy wide shocks affect 
countries differently is the topic of a growing body of literature.1
 * Steven Brakman 
 s.brakman@rug.nl
 Charles van Marrewijk 
 J.G.M.vanMarrewijk@uu.nl
1 University of Groningen, PO Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands
2 Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
1 See for examples and recent surveys: (i) the 2010 special issue of the Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy, and Society on The Resilient Region, (ii) the 2014 special issue of Raumforschung und Rau-
mordnung on Regional Economic Resilience: Policy Experiences and Issues in Europe, and (iii) the 2016 
special issue of Regional Studies on Resilience Revisited.
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The Great Recession, which started in 2008, is an example of an economy-
wide shock which illustrates that not all countries respond in the same way. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates this for Asia, the USA and the Euro area. The size of this shock 
has not been seen since the 1930s, see Irwin (2012). We analyse the role played by 
international trade linkages through supply chains (or global value chains) in the 
decline and recovery process following the Great Recession using various measures 
related to value-added trade flows (forward, backward, and total linkages) and the 
Grubel–Lloyd index of intra-industry trade.
The Grubel–Lloyd index has the advantage that it allows us to use more detailed 
data than value-added measures. In general, we find hardly any effect for the value-
added measures of supply chains, but strong effects for the Grubel–Lloyd index: a 
more intense involvement in intra-industry trade flows implies that the duration of 
the trade recovery takes longer, such that the timing of the recovery is later. This 
finding also helps us to, partially, explain Europe’s recovery problem, see Salvatore 
(2017).
The observation that countries respond differently to shocks is by now well-
established, see Fingleton et al. (2012), Brakman et al. (2015b), Martin and Sunley 
(2015), Bailey and Turok (2016), and Martin et al. (2016). These studies, however, 
have an inward-looking methodology; countries are most often studied in isola-
tion with scant attention for linkages between countries and the global economy. 
This is remarkable as the recent attention for supply chains hints at a relationship 
between the different responses of countries to shocks and international linkages. 
The World Trade Organization (2009, p. 2), for example, notes: “…the magnitude 
of recent declines relates to the increasing presence of global supply chains in total 
trade…—goods cross many frontiers during the production process and components 
in the final product are counted every time they cross a frontier. … this effect, whose 
magnitude can only be guessed at in the absence of systematic information….” 












Fig. 1  Volume of trade, selected global regions and countries; index (2005 = 100). Source: Based on 
monthly data from CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB); trade volume for a 
country or region is average of export and import index
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as recoveries can be magnified due to ‘inventory’ effects (the so-called bullwhip 
effect).2 Brakman et al. (2015b) suggest a link between regional specialization pat-
terns (due to comparative advantage) and resilience.3 If specialization patterns are 
driven by international competition then a link between trade and resilience should 
be visible.
At the country level, the current discussion on the impact of supply chains on 
the Great Recession is inconclusive, ranging from Altomonte et  al. (2012) on the 
one hand to Wagner and Gelübcke (2014) and Behrens et  al. (2013) on the other 
hand. In these studies, Altomonte et al. (2012) note for France that along a global 
supply chain shocks as well as recoveries can be magnified due to a bullwhip effect, 
Wagner and Gelübcke (2014) conclude for Germany that the hypothesis that foreign 
multinationals are more volatile following a negative shock is not supported by their 
empirical research, while Behrens et  al. (2013) conclude that value chains play a 
minor role in Belgium, and in line with this observation Bems et al. (2011) find a 
dampening effect of supply chains on the trade collapse of 2009.
For this paper it is, however, not the inconclusiveness of the debate that is inter-
esting: it is whether the heterogeneity of country experiences can be linked to par-
ticipation in global supply chain linkages. Our main conclusion is straightforward; a 
strong involvement in global supply chains as measured by the Grubel–Lloyd index 
slows down the recovery of countries to recessions. Our findings are consistent with 
Altomonte et  al. (2012) who point out that with longer supply chains a bullwhip 
effect is likely and that the impact of (export) credit restraints after the crisis might 
have restricted trade along supply chains.
Section 2 describe the data and provides some highlights on the Great Recession 
and the timing of various stages of the ‘trade-cycle’. Section 3 explains our method-
ology. Section 4 discusses some advantages and disadvantages of measures of sup-
ply chains. Section 5 links these measures to the Great Recession, while Sect. 6 pro-
vides a survival analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2  Data and descriptive statistics
We use four main data sources. First, our primary data source for the analysis below 
on the timing and extent of the Great Recession is based on real monthly data (based 
on gross trade flows) from the World Trade Monitor (WTM) kindly provided to us 
by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB).4 The objective of 
the WTM is to provide a monitor for developments in global international trade as 
well as industrial production, but we restrict attention to trade flows only. The CPB 
processes over 3300 source series for its trade data on the basis of which it compiles 
2 The bullwhip effect indicates that changes along the supply chain become magnified as they built on 
one each other. At the end of the chain the effects are large. Altomonte et al. (2012) focus on the owner-
ship structure of French firms and find that the magnifying effects of supply chains is larger for within 
firm trade than for arms’s length trade.
3 See Brakman and van Marrewijk (2017) and Ceglowski (2017) on measuring comparative advantages 
and Egger et al. (2017) on connections associated with goods-trade networks.
4 We refer to this data as CPB-WTM data.
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generic monthly series for each included country that is standardized regarding fre-
quency (monthly), denomination (US dollar), indexation, and seasonal and working 
day adjustment. In addition, the CPB compiles a consistent series of values, prices, 
and volumes, see CPB (2013) for technical details. We focus attention on monthly 
trade volume data measured in millions of constant 2005 US dollar for 80 individual 
countries.
Figure 1 already shows a big difference in trade recovery (resilience) for global 
regions. The CPB identifies eight major regions (four advanced regions and four 
emerging regions). At the aggregate level, the timing of the trough (the minimum) 
occurs early in Emerging Asia and at about the same time in other countries. The 
timing of the recovery, that is the return to the pre-crisis trade volume, varies enor-
mously. It is quick in Emerging Asia and slow in the Euro Area. The paper analyzes 
countries (and not global regions), as illustrated by the slow recovery in Japan and 
the intermediate recovery in the USA in Fig. 1.
To analyse the possible connections between supply chains and the Great Reces-
sion we use three main secondary data sources, namely the (i) World Development 
Indicators (WDI) online, (ii) the OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added (TiVA) data-
base, and (iii) the Brülhart (2008) intra-industry trade data.
 (i) The WDI is our source of information on population (in million) and income 
per capita (GDP PPP in constant 2011 international dollars). The income data 
is supplemented with information from the CIA World Factbook for missing 
data, see van Marrewijk (2017) for details.
 (ii) The TiVA database is our source of information for value-added based indi-
cators of supply chain involvement, such as backward linkages (the share 
of foreign value-added in gross exports) and forward linkages (the share of 
domestic value-added directed to intermediate goods in gross exports).
 (iii) We use the Brülhart data, compiled in preparation for the World Bank (2009) 
World Development Report, as our source for a country’s involvement in intra-
industry trade flows. Note that Brülharts results are based on detailed gross 
trade flows, where we use his 5-digit and 3-digit trade-weighted Grubel–Lloyd 
index as an indicator for supply chain involvement. Whenever we refer to the 
Grubel–Lloyd index, please keep in mind that it is based on gross trade flows.
Based on the CPB-WTM real gross trade data, the pre-crisis peak in world trade 
occurs in March 2008, the crisis-trough occurs 12 months later in March 2009, and 
it takes another 20 months until November 2010 for trade to recover to the pre-crisis 
peak level. This timing varies, of course, for the 76 individual countries we analyse.
• The median country peak occurs in April 2008, ranging from January 2007 for 
Ireland and Italy to January 2009 for Paraguay.
• The median country trough occurs in April 2009 (1 year after the peak), ranging 
from the first trough in November 2008 for Vietnam to the last trough 1 year and 
11 months later in October 2010 for Oman.
• As of the start of 2016 (using information up to February) no less than 16 coun-
tries (21% of all countries, representing 27% of the trade flows) still had not 
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recovered their trade flows to the pre-crisis peak level. Of the 60 countries that 
did recover, the median recovery occurred in January 2011, ranging from the first 
recovery in August 2009 for Vietnam to the most recent recovery 6 years later in 
August 2015 for Belgium.
These observations are illustrated using cumulative distributions in Fig.  2 in two 
panels, where panel a uses the country’s weight in total trade flows and panel b uses 
the country as unit of observation. The figure illustrates that the timing of the trough 
is quite steep around April 2009 and that the time to recovery varies substantially 
between countries. In fact, 16 countries had not yet recovered; namely three coun-
tries in Asia (Iran, Japan, and United Arab Emirates) and 13 countries in Europe 
(Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, and UK).
Table  1 provides basic statistics on the Great Recession at the country level. 
We already discussed the median, minimum, and maximum values for the timing 













































Fig. 2  Timing of peak, trough, and recovery; cumulative distribution. Source: Authors’s calculations 
using centered 5-month moving average trade (see Sect. 3); the median values for recovery are based on 
the countries who have recovered in 2016
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peak and trough, but substantially higher for recovery, namely around August 2011 
instead of February–March, indicating a skewed distribution. The standard devia-
tion of the timing of the trough is 0.31 years, somewhat smaller than for the peak 
(0.39 years) and substantially smaller than for recovery (1.65 years). This indicates 
again large variation between countries in terms of recovery (see Table  7 in the 
“Appendix” for a complete list of countries).
The average size of the decline is 21%, ranging from 3.8% for Bolivia to 45.4% 
for Ukraine. The median duration of the decline is 12  months, ranging from 
6 months for six different countries to 37 months for Ireland. The median duration 
of the recovery (for the countries that have recovered) is 21 months, ranging from 
6 months for Indonesia to 76 months for Belgium and Malaysia. The median total 
duration (decline plus recovery for the countries that have recovered) is 35 months, 
ranging from 13 months for Paraguay (14 months for China and South Korea) to 
97 months for Ireland. In all cases the average duration is higher than the median.
The median speed of the decline is 1.8% per month, substantially faster than the 
median speed of recovery which is 1.0% per month. The speed of the decline ranges 
from about 0.4% per month for Algeria, Oman, and Ireland to 5.7% per month 
for Ukraine. The speed of recovery ranges from a crawling 0.23% per month for 
Belgium to more than ten times that speed for China and Paraguay. The variation 
between countries is large.
Our hypothesis is that international trade linkages could explain the differences 
between countries with respect to the way they experienced the great recession. A 
straightforward measure of linkages is to look at global supply chains. Modern trade 
is characterized by the fragmentation of the production process that links countries 
to each other (Baldwin 2016). This linkage implies that a shock on one end of this 
chain could travel all the way to the other end.
Table 1  Summary of Great Recession statistics, country level. Source: Authors’s calculations
Timing: x.00 = January, each extra month adds 1/12; size = extent of the decline from peak to trough in 
percent
Average Median Minimum Maximum SD #Obs
Peak 2008.25 2008.25 2007.00 2009.00 0.39 76
Trough 2009.35 2009.25 2008.83 2010.75 0.31 76
Recovery 2011.58 2011.04 2009.58 2015.58 1.65 60
Size (%) 20.93 20.60 3.76 45.45 6.92 76
Duration (months)
Decline 13.2 12 6 37 5.53 76
Recovery 27.1 21 6 76 19.46 60
Total 39.7 35 13 97 22.01 60
Speed (% per month)
Decline 1.79 1.77 0.37 5.68 0.83 76
Recovery 1.06 0.98 0.23 2.50 0.60 60
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3  Methodology
We apply a simple definition of recovery; the time it takes to recover from a shock, 
that is, to return to the original (trend) level. We do not look at possible changes in 
sector structure or innovations that could be important for recovery. Our method-
ology is most easily explained by example. Figure 3 depicts the volume of ‘trade’ 
flows, which is calculated as the average of exports and imports. At the world level 
the difference between exports and imports is less than 0.3% in January 2008 (which 
is the index month in Fig. 3, see below). For individual countries this difference can, 
of course, be much larger as countries can have a substantial trade surplus or deficit 
at a point in time.
The solid line in Fig. 3 depicts the monthly volume of world trade, which varies 
substantially from 1 month to the next. The Great Recession adversely affected the 
volume of world trade in particular from July 2008 to March 2009, while recovery 
is clear in the second half of 2009. To investigate the extent of the recession, the 
duration of the decline, and the speed at which the recession affected the volume of 
trade, we have to determine the pre-recession ‘peak’ as well as the ‘trough’, the low 
point of the recession. To investigate the duration of the recovery from the reces-
sion and the speed at which this occurs, we have to determine the post-recession 
‘recovery’.
1. We define the peak as the maximum volume of trade in the period January 2007–
March 2009.5 Using monthly data at the world level the peak occurs in January 
2008, which we therefore take as the basis for our volume index.
2. We define the trough as the minimum volume of trade in the period 2008–2010. 
Using monthly data at the world level the trough occurs in May 2009, with an 
index of 79.5. This implies that the extent of the decline (the fall since the peak) 
for the world is 20.5%, the duration of the decline (from peak to trough) is 
16 months, and the average speed of the decline is 1.28% per month ( = 20.5∕16
%).
3. We define recovery as the first post-trough moment the volume of trade exceeds 
the peak level. Using monthly data at the world level recovery occurs in Novem-
ber 2010. This implies that the duration of the recovery (from trough to recov-
ery) for the world is 18 months, the speed of the recovery is 1.14% per month 
( = 20.5∕18%), and the total duration (from peak to recovery) is 34 months (16 
plus 18).
It is apparent from Fig. 3 that determining peak, trough, and recovery on the basis 
of monthly data depends to a fair extent on the ‘natural’ monthly fluctuations, even 
at the world level. After the peak in January 2008, for example, the volume of world 
trade declines in February and March of 2008, but then bounces back to almost the 
January level (at 99.8%) in April 2008, which could therefore be taken as an ‘almost 
5 This is 1 year before the global peak in levels to 1 year after the global peak in 5-month moving aver-
age, see below for details.
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peak’. Similarly, after the recovery in November 2010 the volume of trade declines 
below the peak level in December 2010 (at 99.7%) before bouncing back above that 
level in January 2011.
To reduce the impact of monthly fluctuations we calculated 5-month centered 
moving average trade flows, which are also depicted in Fig. 3. Using the method-
ology outlined above for this new series, the peak of world trade occurs 2 months 
later in March 2008 (at an index of 100.8), the trough occurs 2 months earlier in 
March 2012 (at an index of 82.3), and recovery occurs in the same month (Novem-
ber 2010). The timing of peak, trough, and recovery based on the centered 5-month 
moving average series is quite clear; note that the extent of the decline is somewhat 
smaller ( = 100 ∗ (100.8 − 82.3)∕100.8 = 18.4 instead of 20.5%), the duration of the 
decline is somewhat shorter (12 instead of 16 months), the speed of the decline is 
somewhat higher ( = 18.4∕12 = 1.53 instead of 1.28% per month), the duration of 
the recovery is somewhat longer (20 instead of 18 months), the speed of the recov-
ery is somewhat smaller ( = 18.4∕20 = 0.92 instead of 1.14% per month), and the 
total duration is somewhat shorter (32 instead of 34  months). Also note that all 
measures are related to the peak at 100.8 (and not the index value 100).
Our analysis is based at the volume of trade flows at the country level using the 
centered 5-month moving average methodology (from now on: unless stated other-
wise). We have data for 80 individual countries (see for a complete list Table 7 in the 
“Appendix”). The idea is to have a country information similar to that depicted in 
Fig. 3, such that we can attribute timing, decline, and recovery to the Great Reces-
sion and not to other fluctuations or influences. For two countries (Iraq and Qatar) 
trade flows continued to rise for at least five more months beyond the peak of point 
1 above. For two countries (Greece and Luxembourg) trade flows continued to 
decline to a minimum below the trough of point 2 above. These four countries were 













2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
monthly 
observaons
5-month centered moving average
Fig. 3  The Great Recession; volume of world trade, index (January 2008 = 100). Source: Compiled from 
CPB-WTM gross trade volume; trade is average of export and import volume; square is peak; circle is 
trough; triangle is recovery
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(accounting for 5.4 billion people [3/4th of the world population] and more than 
90% of world trade flows).6
4  Measuring supply chains
Adequately measuring supply chains is notoriously difficult as it involves the simul-
taneous importing and exporting of goods and components at different stages of the 
production process in related sectors. Streams are usually co-ordinated at the firm 
level, often involving multinational enterprises and different countries (allowing for 
differences in comparative advantages). As a consequence, supply chains connect 
countries at different levels of economic development.
One way to measure supply chains is to focus on the value-added at different 
stages of the production process. Great advances have been made recently, for exam-
ple thanks to the work of the World Input Output Data (WIOD) database at the Uni-
versity of Groningen (www.wiod.orgy) and the combined work of the Organization 
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) in the Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database. We use the TiVA 
database as it incorporates a larger range of countries. At the country level, supply 
chains are measured in the TiVA database in three different ways:
• Backward linkages; this measures the share of value-added in export flows that is 
imported from abroad.
• Forward linkages; this measures the share of domestic value-added content in 
export flows that is used as an intermediate input of foreign sectors.
• Total linkages; this is the sum of backward and forward linkages.
Figure 4 ranks countries according to Forward and Backward linkages (panel a), and 
Total linkages (panel b). As Fig. 4a illustrates, the countries with the highest scor-
ing forward linkages are the oil exporting nations Saudi Arabia and Brunei (87% 
of gross exports). This reflects the fact that most of the exported oil is used as an 
intermediate input in virtually all sectors of the importing countries. Other countries 
with high forward linkages are Russia and Rest of World (70% of gross exports). 
The global average forward linkage is 49% of gross exports, which is about equal 
to the value for the UK and close to the values for USA (51%) and Germany (46%).
The highest backward linkage by far is provided by Luxembourg (59%). This 
reflects the fact that many sectors in Luxembourg intensively use imported inter-
mediate inputs in the production process. The backward linkages are equal to one 
minus the domestic value-added share. This implies that the countries scoring high 
in domestic value-added, such as Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Rest of World, and Russia, 
score low in backward linkages. The global average backward linkage is 24%, which 
is close to the value for the UK, India, and Canada (the latter two are not identified 
6 Per cent of world trade is based on World Development Indicators online, sum of exports and imports 
of goods and services of included countries in 2008 (BoP, current USD); excludes Taiwan.
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separately in the figure). The USA has clearly lower backward linkages (15%), while 
Germany and China have higher backward linkages (26 and 32%, respectively), 
reflecting the fact that German and Chinese sectors more intensively use imported 
components from other countries in their production processes than UK and USA.
The sum of the backward and forward linkages is generally taken as an indi-
cation of the intensity with which a country participates in global value chains, 


























































(a) Backward and Forward Linkages
Fig. 4  Value-added based supply chain linkages. a Backward and forward linkages. b Total linkages: 
sum of backward and forward linkages. Source: Based on TiVA trade in value added database; bubble 
size proportional to gross exports
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see Koopman et  al. (2010). Figure  4b shows this measure for 1995 and 2011. It 
shows that participation in global value chains is rising over time: the values for 
the 2011 score tend to be above those for the 1995 score. The global average sum 
of backward and forward linkages increased from 65% in 1995 to 73% in 2011. The 
ranking tends to be rather persistent over time, with Germany and Rest of World 
moving up, while USA and China are moving down. Also note the increase in bub-
ble size for China and Rest of World, indicating their rapidly rising importance in 
global trade flows.
Brakman et al. (2015a) discuss some advantages and disadvantages of measuring 
supply chains using value-added data. The main limitations are:
 (i) The informational requirements for constructing the data are high. As a con-
sequence, only a relatively small number of mostly advanced countries are 
included in the analysis. This makes it difficult to adequately assess the per-
formance of the included countries relative to the excluded countries. It also 
means that countries with a lower level of economic development are excluded 
from the analysis. Indeed, none of the least developed countries is included in 
the WIOD database.
 (ii) The number of sectors is limited. This is necessary since the construction 
uses input–output tables that are only available on a rather coarse scale. This 
contrasts with the detailed information involving thousands of goods for gross 
exports at the 5-digit level. Actual supply chains are based on this much more 
minute detail. As a consequence, the value added to gross export ratio has a 
problem adequately identifying the large countries involved in global supply 
chains (34 for TiVA and 35 for WIOD).
 (iii) The value-added based measures can be deceptive. Let’s take Saudi Arabia as 
an example (see Fig. 4). It’s oil exports are used as an intermediate input in 
many countries. This does not mean that Saudi Arabia is part of supply chains 
in the sense that oil is part of fragmentation of the production processes that 
has been made possible by the information technology revolution (Baldwin 
2016). Oil supplied by Saudi Arabia can easily be replaced by oil supply from 
another source (for example by shale oil produced in the US). In contrast, a 
faulty taptic engine for the Apple watch in 2015 disrupted the production 
process severely as no substitutes were available. Other examples are Brunei 
and Russia that also score high in the value-added index but their involvement 
in global supply chains mimics that of Saudi Arabia and is rather limited. As 
Fig. 4 illustrates the linkages for these countries are restricted to mostly for-
ward linkages. On the other end of the picture, the USA, China, and Germany 
only score relatively low on the value-added supply chain index, whereas it is 
extensively documented that all three countries play an important role in many 
global supply chains (Baldwin 2016, p. 97). Their low score seems related to 
the relative size of their trade flows rather than their actual involvement in 
global supply.
Given these limitations an alternative measure of supply chains is warranted. A key 
characteristic of supply chains is the two-way nature of trade flows; a supply chain 
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connects forward and backward linkages in international trade flows. This points 
towards the Grubel–Lloyd index as a possible alternative. The advantages of this 
measure are that (i) information is available for almost all countries, (ii) informa-
tion is available at a detailed sector level, and (iii) it solves the ‘too distant’ value-
added problem of Saudi Arabia discussed above by excluding trade flows with other 
sectors. This, however, potentially introduces a bias. Since supply chains measured 
by the Grubel–Lloyd index involve two-way trade within the same sector, it can be 
biased if intermediate products come from outside the sector itself. Broadening the 
definition of sectors deals with this problem to some extent. This is what we do in 
our analysis where we use the Grubel–Lloyd index for 3-digit sectors and 5-digit 
sectors. The differences in the outcomes for these two different levels of aggregation 
are indicative for the size of the potential bias.
International supply chains involve the trade of intermediate goods from one 
location to another. This can be in the same sector (which is picked-up by the 
Grubel–Lloyd index), or from one sector to another (which is not included in the 
Grubel–Lloyd index, depending on the level of aggregation). Trade of final goods 
is not part of supply chains, but may be included in the Grubel–Lloyd index to the 
extent it is in the same sector. Under the technical assumption that most intermediate 
trade—within a supply chain—is trade within the same sector (in our case defined as 
a 3-digit or 5-digit sector) and that final product deliveries within the sectors do not 
systematically affect intra-industry trade flows, we can use the Grubel–Lloyd index 
as a method for measuring supply chains. The higher the index the more important 
are supply chains, see the “Appendix” for a brief sector discussion. We analyse these 
data based on the work of Brülhart (2008).
Note that a similar technical caveat holds for value-added measures which con-
ceptually are more strictly related to supply chains than GL-index measures (that 
include trade in final products). In practice one has to deal with issues like data 
availability and strong assumptions. In a survey of global supply chain measures 
Johnson (2018) mentions—among other complications—that the construction 
of input–output data relies on imputation because of lacking data and tables are 
often only available at aggregated levels for benchmark years that are asynchronous 
across countries. Also sector classifications across countries differ and input–output 
tables are not always consistent with national account data. With respect to strong 
assumptions that have to be made, Johnson (2018) points towards the problematic 
assumptions that imported intermediate goods are used with the same input–out-
put coefficients (intensity) in domestic production and exports at high levels of 
aggregation.
In this paper, we stress the use of the Grubel–Lloyd index as our preferred meas-
ure of supply chains, as it is more closely related to actual supply chains and allows 
us to use more detailed data than value-added based measures. For comparison and 
completeness, however, we also provide information on the links between value-
added based measures and the Great Recession in the discussion below. Our analy-
sis of the Great Recession uses data for 76 countries. The TiVA database (covering 
61 countries) provides information on the backward and forward linkages for 55 of 
our 76 countries. The Grubel–Lloyd index is available for all countries. Europe and 
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(especially) Germany are spiders in the supply chain web.7 Figure 5 therefore distin-
guishes between European and Other countries and provides information regarding 
the extent to which the total linkages supply chain measure is related to the 5-digit 
Grubel–Lloyd index: there is virtually no relationship between these two measures 
(the correlation coefficient is even mildly negative: − 0.065).
Countries like Saudi Arabia and Russia score high on total linkages (thanks to 
their strong forward linkages) but low on the Grubel–Lloyd index; countries like 
Argentina and Croatia score low on total linkages and low-medium on Grubel–Lloyd 
index; countries like the UK and Germany score medium on total linkages and high 
on Grubel–Lloyd index. Other countries, such as Canada and the US also score high 
on the Grubel–Lloyd index.
Table 2 explains why the correlation between total linkages and the Grubel–Lloyd 
index is so low: there is a reasonably strong positive correlation between backward 
linkages and the Grubel–Lloyd index (0.392), which is almost perfectly compen-
sated by a reasonably strong negative correlation between forward linkages and the 
Table 2  Correlation coefficients 
between different supply chain 
measures. Source: Authors’s 
calculations; 55 countries 
included
Backward- and forward linkages are based on value-added trade 
flows, while Grubel–Lloyd index is based on gross trade flows
GL5 5-digit Grubel–Lloyd index, GL3 3-digit Grubel–Lloyd index
GL5 GL3 Backward Forward
GL3 0.960 1.000
Backward 0.392 0.361 1.000
Forward − 0.386 − 0.356 − 0.782 1.000

























Fig. 5  Supply chain measures; total linkage and 5-digit Grubel–Lloyd. Source: Authors’s calculations; 55 
countries included
7 The term spider indicates that supply chains are not necessarily linear, but that the ‘spider ‘receives 
intermediate inputs from all directions.
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Grubel–Lloyd index (− 0.386). The table also shows that there is a strong negative 
correlation between backward and forward linkages (− 0.782): countries with high 
backward linkages tend to have low forward linkages, and vice versa. The next sec-
tion thus analyzes backward and forward linkages both jointly and separately. As we 
explained above the Grubel–Lloyd (GL) index as a measure for supply chains can 
be sensitive to aggregation, we therefore provide estimates for both GL5 and GL3 
measures separately in the regressions below for sensitivity reasons.
5  Supply chains and the Great Recession
We analyse the links between supply chains and the impact of the Great Reces-
sion. In Sect. 5.1 we focus on the Grubel–Lloyd index (based on gross exports). In 
Sect. 5.2 we provide an analysis using value-added measures.
5.1  Grubel–Lloyd index and the Great Recession
Section 4 suggests that some countries are more heavily involved in global supply 
chains. If supply chains have an important role to play in resilience these countries 
should stand-out in our analyses. Table 3 provides an overview of the differences 
Table 3  Europe versus other 
country differences in supply 
chain characteristics. Source: 
Authors’s calculations
Backward-, forward-, and total linkages are based on value-added 
trade flows, while the Grubel–Lloyd index is based on gross trade 
flows
GL5 5-digit GL index
a Countries for which backward, forward, and total linkages are also 
available
b Based on size of trade flows in 2008
GL5 GL5a Backward Forward Total
(a) Other countries
Minimum 0.0 0.0 3.3 33.3 58.2
Maximum 42.1 42.1 43.6 87.0 90.3
Average 12.2 18.6 24.0 49.0 73.0
Weighted-average# 22.9 24.0 24.5 46.7 71.2
Observations 43 26 26 26 26
(b) European countries
Minimum 3.9 3.9 13.7 27.0 47.2
Maximum 42.4 42.4 48.7 69.7 86.1
Average 25.3 27.3 30.5 42.1 72.6
Weighted-average# 34.6 35.1 25.7 46.2 71.9
Observations 33 29 29 29 29
(c) European average minus other country average (as percent of 
other country average)
Weighted-averageb 52 46 5 − 1 1
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in characteristics of the supply chain measures for Other Countries (panel a) versus 
European Countries (panel b) and compares the difference in trade-weighted aver-
ages (panel c).
The GL5 column in Table 3 provides the summary statistics of the Grubel–Lloyd 
index for all 76 countries in the data set (33 European countries and 43 Other coun-
tries). It indicates that the range (minimum, maximum, and their difference) is quite 
similar for Other- and European Countries, but that the weighted average is substan-
tially larger for European countries, namely about 12 percentage points (or about 
52% higher than the Other countries’ trade-weighted average).8 This motivates why 
we identify European countries separately. Since we do not have the value-added 
supply chain measures available for all countries, column GL5* repeats the exercise 
for the 55 countries for which we do have backward, forward, and total linkages 
available (29 European countries and 26 Other countries). We arrive at the same 
conclusion: the average is substantially higher for European countries compared 
to other countries, namely about 11 percentage points (or about 46% of the Other 
countries’ trade-weighted average). Again this confirms that European countries 
stand-out.
The columns backward, forward, and total repeat the exercise for the value-added 
supply chain measures. There are modest differences in the ranges of the supply 
chain measures (which is somewhat smaller for European countries in both back-
ward and forward linkages, but somewhat larger for European countries in total 
linkages). This time, however, there are only small differences in the averages for 
European versus Other countries, namely of only about one percentage point for 
backward linkages, forward linkages, and total linkages (which translates to about 
5%, − 1%, and 1% of the Other countries’ trade-weighted averages). The conclusion 
is therefore simple: the differences between European countries and Other coun-
tries regarding the value-added supply chain measures are small, but regarding the 
Grubel–Lloyd index are substantial.
Figure 6 shows the relationship between the Grubel–Lloyd index and the dura-
tion of the decline (in months). The figure depicts a modest positive relationship 
between the duration of the decline and the Grubel–Lloyd index which is not sig-
nificant (see Table 4 and the discussion below). This holds for both groups of coun-
tries. Among the Other countries group the duration of the decline is, for exam-
ple, short in China (6 months) with a medium–low Grubel–Lloyd index and long in 
Canada (22 months) with a high Grubel–Lloyd index, with Japan and the USA in 
between. Among the European countries the duration of the decline is short in Rus-
sia (9 months) with a low Grubel–Lloyd index and long in the UK, Italy, and Ger-
many with a high Grubel–Lloyd index, with a range of small countries in between.
Table 4 provides an overview of the impact of supply chains measured using the 
Grubel–Lloyd index on nine variables of the Great Recession (note that we included 
control variables, such as income per capita, volume of trade, and population size; 
these are not reported and available upon request). The left part of the table focuses 
8 Results for GL3 and GL3* are similar to GL5 and GL5* and therefore not reported separately in 
Table 3.
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on the GL5 index and the right part of the table provides GL3 estimates for compari-
son. The table shows that a high Grubel–Lloyd index significantly affects the timing 
of peak (earlier), trough (earlier to a smaller extent), and recovery (later), as well as 
the size of the decline (bigger), the duration of the recovery, and the total duration 
(decline + recovery). The duration of the decline only and the speed of decline and 
recovery are not significantly affected.
Table 4  Regression overview 
with intra-industry trade and 
control variables. Source: 
Authors’s calculations
Bold emphasis are significant at 10% or better; number of observa-
tions is 76 for peak, trough, decline and size rows and 60 for recovery 
and total rows; includes controls (reported in “Appendix” Table 8) for 
log income per capita, log trade size, and log population size
p values *0.1 significance, **0.05 significance, ***0.01 significance
a Ignores information on countries which have not yet recovered; see 
Sect. 6 for survival analysis
Variable Grubel–Lloyd 5-digit Grubel–Lloyd 3-digit
GL5 P > |t| R2 GL3 P > |t| R2
Timing (year)
Peak − 0.013*** 0.000 0.269 − 0.009*** 0.000 0.249
Trough − 0.008*** 0.008 0.167 − 0.007*** 0.002 0.191
Recoverya 0.041** 0.021 0.243 0.025* 0.057 0.219
Size (%) 0.155** 0.029 0.084 0.134*** 0.010 0.108
Duration (months)
Decline 0.061 0.256 0.166 0.027 0.490 0.156
Recoverya 0.572*** 0.007 0.258 0.365** 0.019 0.235
Totala 0.652*** 0.006 0.288 0.404** 0.019 0.261
Speed (% per month)
Decline 0.000 0.976 0.094 0.004 0.549 0.098




























Fig. 6  Grubel–Lloyd index and the duration of the decline in months. Source: Authors’s calculations; 76 
countries included; dotted line is a regression for all countries
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If we take the 11.1 percentage points higher Grubel–Lloyd index for European 
countries versus Other countries (see Table 3) for the significant variables of the left 
part of Table 4 as an indication, this implies that as a result of the more intensive 
involvement of European countries in supply chains the timing of the trade peak 
occurred in Europe about 53 days earlier, the trough about 32 days earlier, and the 
recovery about 166 days later.9 As a consequence, the duration of the recovery (for 
the countries that have recovered) was about 190 days longer, and the total duration 
about 217 days longer. So, the involvement in global supply chains affects the resil-
ience of countries considerably.10
Figure 7 illustrates the longer duration of the recovery for the 60 countries that 
have recovered. A high Grubel–Lloyd index implies that it takes longer to recover 
from the Great Recession. Among the Other countries this holds, for example, for 
Canada and Thailand. Among the European countries it holds, for example, for 
Belgium and Germany. These findings are consistent with Altomonte et al. (2012) 
who point out that with longer supply chains a bullwhip effect is likely and also the 
impact of (export) credit restraints after the crisis might have restricted trade along 
supply chains.
So what about the countries that have not yet recovered in January 2016 which 
are excluded from Fig. 7? Part of the reason for their late recovery is related to their 
involvement in supply chains as measured by the Grubel–Lloyd index. The simple 
average Grubel–Lloyd index of the countries that have recovered from the Great 
Recession is 16.2%, which is substantially lower than the 24.0% average for the 
countries that have not yet recovered. This discrepancy persists (but becomes some-
what smaller) if we take trade-weighted averages, namely an average of 26.6% for 
the recovered countries compared to an average of 31.0% for the countries that have 





























Fig. 7  Grubel–Lloyd index and the duration of the recovery in months. Source: Authors’s calculations; 
60 countries included; dotted line is a regression for all countries
9 Regarding timing of the peak, for example: − 0.013 times 11.1 is − 0.14 years or − 53 days, and so on.
10 These effects persist for all variables when a Europe control is added.
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5.2  Value‑added measures and the Great Recession
The Grubel–Lloyd measure allows us to use detailed trade data. A disadvantage is 
that it is based on gross exports instead of value-added exports. Value-added meas-
ures are argued to be more closely related to supply chains, but have to rely on 
aggregated data. This section provides estimates based on value-added measures. 
The main relationship between the impact of the Great Recession and the value-
added measures of supply chains is illustrated for backward linkages and the dura-
tion of the decline (measured in months) in Fig.  8: there is no relationship. The 
duration of the decline was short (6 months) in Saudi Arabia with virtually no back-
ward linkages as well as in China and South Korea with substantial backward link-
ages. Similarly, the duration of the decline was high in Ireland (37  months) with 
high backward linkages, but also high in Italy and Canada (29 and 22 months) with 
medium backward linkages. A formal regression shows indeed that there is no rela-
tionship between the size of the backward linkages and the duration of the decline 
in months (see the discussion around Table 5 below for details). The duration of the 
decline is chosen for illustration purposes as it includes all 55 countries for which 
we have value-added data, in contrast to the duration of the recovery which includes 
only 42 countries (see the discussion below and Sect. 6).
Table  5 summarizes the absence of a relationship between value-added supply 
chain measures and the Great Recession in two parts (note that, as in Sect. 5.1, we 
include controls such as income per capita, volume of trade, and population size; 
these results are not in the table but available upon request).
Table  5a analyzes the joint impact of backward and forward linkages on nine 
different Great Recession variables, namely the timing (in years) of (i) peak, (ii) 
trough, and (iii) recovery, (iv) the size of the decline, the duration (in months) of (v) 
the decline, (vi) the recovery, and (vii) in total (sum of decline and recovery), and 
finally the speed (in percent per month) of (viii) decline and (ix) recovery. Not one 
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as supply chain linkages are expected to force countries to move in tandem with 
respect to recessions, and even to magnify linkages along the supply chain; a pos-
sibility explained by Altomonte et al. (2012) in a different setting.
Table 5b provides separate estimates of the impact of backward linkages, forward 
linkages, and total linkages on each of the nine Great Recession variables. Only 
the timing of the peak is positively affected by forward linkages and the size of the 
decline is positively affected by backward linkages, which is almost perfectly com-
pensated in the opposite direction by forward linkages, such that there is no effect if 
Table 5  Regression overview with backward and forward linkages as exogenous variable. Source: 
Authors’s calculations
Bold emphasis are significant at 10% or better; number of observations is 55 for Peak, trough, decline 
and size rows and 42 for recovery and total rows; includes controls (reported in “Appendix” Table 9) for 
log income per capita, log trade size, and log population size
p values *0.1 significance, **0.05 significance, ***0.01 significance
a Ignores information on countries which have not yet recovered; see Sect. 6 for survival analysis
Variable Backward P > |t| Forward P > |t| R2
(a) Backward- and forward linkages jointly
Timing (years)
 Peak 0.00186 0.803 0.00881 0.184 0.196
 Trough − 0.000687 0.877 0.00128 0.745 0.113
 Recoverya 0.0442 0.341 0.0249 0.553 0.217
 Size (%) 0.0684 0.546 − 0.0775 0.438 0.172
Duration (months)
 Decline − 0.0306 0.789 − 0.0904 0.372 0.192
 Recoverya 0.510 0.348 0.249 0.612 0.208
 Totala − 0.495 0.396 − 0.746 0.149 0.287
Speed (% per month)
 Decline 0.0192 0.131 0.0105 0.345 0.273
 Recoverya − 0.00417 0.772 − 0.00894 0.495 0.337
Variable Backward P > |t| R2 Forward P > |t| R2 Total P > |t| R2
(b) Backward-, forward, and total-linkages separately
Timing (years)
 Peak − 0.0057 0.249 0.166 0.0076* 0.080 0.195 0.0071 0.280 0.163
 Trough − 0.0018 0.536 0.111 0.00173 0.495 0.113 0.0008 0.837 0.105
 Recoverya 0.0214 0.403 0.209 − 0.0084 0.719 0.196 0.0292 0.480 0.204
 Size (%) 0.135* 0.071 0.162 − 0.123* 0.062 0.166 − 0.041 0.683 0.108
Duration (months)
 Decline 0.0470 0.529 0.178 − 0.0700 0.286 0.191 − 0.076 0.445 0.181
 Recoverya 0.283 0.346 0.202 − 0.136 0.620 0.188 0.307 0.527 0.191
 Totala 0.146 0.704 0.255 − 0.416 0.216 0.276 − 0.683 0.175 0.280
Speed (% per month)
 Decline 0.0102 0.219 0.259 − 0.0023 0.755 0.238 0.0127 0.247 0.257
 Recoverya 0.00401 0.616 0.328 − 0.0058 0.422 0.335 − 0.008 0.540 0.330
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both are included (see Table 5a). The 24 other estimated coefficients in Table 5b are 
all not statistically significant. We therefore conclude that the value-added supply 
chain measures have only a limited impact on most economic aspects of the Great 
Recession.
6  Survival analysis
A disadvantage of the recovery and total duration analysis in Sect.  5 is that it 
excludes the countries which have not yet recovered at the time of the analysis. 
As this may create a potential bias in our estimates regarding recovery, this sec-
tion briefly analyzes the duration of the recession (by which we mean the number 
of months that have passed since a country’s trade peak) and the duration of the 
recovery using survival analysis, which includes information on not-yet-recovered 
countries. This implies that we use (right) censored data: that is, we observe when a 
country has recovered, or we observe at the last date in the sample that they are not 
yet recovered (recovery might or might not occur outside the sample period).
We start with an analysis in Fig.  9 of the trade-weighted Grubel–Lloyd index 
(GL5) for two groups of countries, namely those that have recovered to the pre-cri-
sis peak level and those that have not-yet-recovered, both after a given number of 
months. In the first 12 months after the trade peak there are only not-yet-recovered 
countries, with an average GL5 index of 27.8%. Paraguay recovers after 13 months, 
followed by Bolivia, China, and South Korea after 14 months. Together these four 
countries account for 12.3% of total trade flows. Their average GL5 recovered index 
is 19.6%, which is substantially lower than the average GL5 index for not-yet-recov-
ered countries after 14  months, which has risen to 28.9% (since it now excludes 
Paraguay, Bolivia, China, and South Korea).
Figure 9 illustrates that the discrepancy between recovered and not-yet-recovered 












duraon (in months) since peak
GL5 not yet recovered
GL5 recovered
global trade share  recovered 
countries (per cent, right-hand scale)
Fig. 9  Duration and Grubel–Lloyd index; recovered and not-yet recovered countries. Source: Authors’s 
calculations; 76 countries included; GL5 = 5-digit trade-weighted Grubel–Lloyd index
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together accounting for 55.2% of total trade flows. Their average GL5 recovered 
index is 22.6%, which is substantially lower than the average GL5 not-yet-recovered 
index after 50 months of 34.1% for the 27 countries who have not yet recovered. 
This continues up to 100  months after the trade peak, although the discrepancy 
gradually diminishes as more and more countries recover. The figure thus illustrates 
that countries with a high Grubel–Lloyd index take longer to recover from the crisis. 
Similar graphs for the value-added measures, backward-, forward-, and total-link-
ages do not show such a difference, see Fig. 11 in the “Appendix”.
We can test the observations in Fig. 9 more formally with the use of duration/sur-
vival analysis, which focuses on the time it takes for an observation to go from one 
state to another state. In our case, we can analyse the time it takes to go from peak to 
trough (column duration decline in Table 6), from trough to recovery (column dura-
tion recovery in Table  6), and from peak to recovery (column duration total in 
Table  6). We are interested whether a strong/weak participation in supply chains 
affects the probability of moving from one stage to another. In order to assign prob-
abilities to this transition we have to make assumptions regarding the statistical 
distribution(s) that govern(s) this process. If, for example, T  is the time it takes to 
recover from the trade-trough to the pre-crisis trade-peak and F(t) = P{T ≤ t} is the 
Table 6  Survival analysis; 
loglogistic distribution. Source: 
Authors’s calculations
Since our data exhibit initially rising and then decreasing hazard 
rates suitable distribution choices are the loglogistic and lognormal 
distributions. As usual, both lead to similar results
Bold emphasis are significant at 10% or better; duration in months; 
regressions are separate per explanatory variable to avoid multi-
collinearity problems; includes controls (reported in “Appendix” 
Table 10) for log income per capita, log trade size, and log popula-
tion size
Backward-, forward-, and total linkages are based on value-added 
trade flows, while the Grubel–Lloyd index is based on gross trade 
flows
p values *0.1 significance, **0.05 significance, ***0.01 significance
Duration variable
Decline Recovery Total
(a) Intra-industry trade measures (76 observations)
Grubel–Lloyd 5-digit 0.00637* 0.02099** 0.01726***
p value 0.079 0.018 0.010
Grubel–Lloyd 3-digit 0.00392 0.01541** 0.01248**
p value 0.146 0.018 0.011
(b) Value-added trade measures (55 observations)
Backward linkages 0.00023 0.00237 0.00226
p value 0.962 0.847 0.809
Forward linkages − 0.00393 − 0.00990 − 0.00868
p value 0.343 0.316 0.246
Total linkages − 0.00711 − 0.02357 − 0.01965
p value 0.215 0.162 0.123
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distribution function with density function f (t) , then the survivor function 
S(t) ≡ 1 − F(t) is the probability that it takes longer than t to recover and the hazard 
function h(t) , which is the instantaneous rate of leaving the initial state per unit of 
time, is defined as: h(t) = f (t)∕S(t) . Since our data exhibit initially rising and then 
decreasing hazard rates, suitable distribution choices are the loglogistic and lognor-
mal distributions. As usual, these lead to similar results. In the loglogistic case 
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 and 훾 a param-
eter to be estimated from the data.11
Table 6 provides the survival analysis for the duration variables decline, recov-
ery, and total. Panel a focuses on the two Grubel–Lloyd measures and finds that 
the Grubel–Lloyd index significantly lenghtens the duration of the recovery and 
total duration. Only the more detailed GL5 index has an effect on the duration of 
the decline. Panel b focuses on the three value-added measures and finds that back-
ward-, forward, and total linkages have no effect on the duration of either decline or 
recovery, nor on total duration. These observations are in line with our findings in 
Tables 4 and 5. The conclusion of our survival analysis thus confirms the analysis 
presented throughout this paper.
7  Conclusion
Global supply chains link countries to each other. A shock like the Great recession 
can be expected to transmit itself throughout this chain. We analyse how this linkage 
affects the extent, the duration, and the time until full recovery of various countries.
The literature on the impact of supply chains on the Great Recession is incon-
clusive, ranging from studies that argue for a magnification effect of global supply 
chains on the extent to which the crisis hits a country (like Altomonte et al. 2012) to 
studies who find only a marginal effect of global supply chains (like Behrens et al. 
2013). We address this question for a wide range of countries and therefore allow for 
heterogeneous country experiences, and whether these can be linked to participation 
in global supply chains.
We study the impact of the Great Recession by identifying supply chains using 
the Grubel–Lloyd index and value-added trade measures. The Grubel–Lloyd index 
allows the use of detailed—gross export—data, while value-added measures can 
only be applied to a sub-sample of countries using highly aggregated data. Both 
types of measures highlight different aspects of supply chains; value-added meas-
ures stress that part of the production is done elsewhere in the world, whereas 
the Grubel–Lloyd index emphasizes international intra-industry linkages. The 
Grubel–Lloyd index has the advantage that countries that are not involved in the 
fragmentation of production processes, such as Saudi Arabia, are not biasing the 
indices.
11 Estimation uses maximum likelihood. Left-censoring occurs if the starting time is not observed; this 
is not the case for our observations. Right-censoring occurs if the duration lasts longer than the last time 
period under investigation; this occurs for 16 countries for the duration of recovery and the total duration.
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The main conclusion is straightforward; a strong involvement in global supply 
chains, as identified by using the Grubel–Lloyd index, raises the size of the decline 
and slows down the recovery of countries following a recession. Consistent with 
Altomonte et al. (2012), our results point towards a slow(er) adjustment of produc-
tion to new expected levels of demand, which could indicate a stronger influence of 
risk aversion at the macro level or changes in trade conditions, for example, more 
stringent export credit prerequisites. This, however, is a topic for future research. In 
contrast, we do not find strong effects for supply chains on the Great Recession when 
using value-added based measures, like backward-, forward-, and total linkages.
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Appendix
Table 7 provides an overview of the countries included in our analysis and indicates 
for which countries we do not have value-added measures available (italicized cells).
Table 7  Overview of 76 
countries included in the 
analysis
No trade in value-added information available for countries with 
italicized cells
Algeria Ecuador Latvia Singapore
Argentina Estonia Lithuania Slovak Rep
Australia Finland Macedonia Slovenia
Austria France Malaysia South Africa
Belarus Germany Malta South Korea
Belgium Guatemala Mexico Spain
Bolivia Hong Kong Morocco Sweden
Brazil Hungary Netherlands Switzerland
Bulgaria Iceland New Zealand Taiwan
Canada India Norway Tanzania
Chile Indonesia Oman Thailand
China Iran Paraguay Turkey
Colombia Ireland Peru Ukraine
Costa Rica Israel Philippines Un. Arab Emirates
Croatia Italy Poland United Kingdom
Cyprus Japan Portugal United States
Czech Rep Kazakhstan Romania Uruguay
Denmark Kenya Russia Vietnam
Dominican Rep Kuwait Saudi Arabia Zambia
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Figure 10 illustrates the ranking of the global average Grubel–Lloyd index at the 
3-digit level using trade-weighted averages at the 5-digit level. The figure distin-
guishes the BEC product grouping in primary goods, intermediate goods, and final 
goods. The global average Grubel–Lloyd index over all sectors is 31.9%. It tends to 
be low for primary goods (like oil and ores) and high for many of the world’s largest 
trading sectors. This holds, for example for instruments (and apparatus, 7% of world 
trade), cars (road motor vehicles, 7.6% of world trade), machines nes nonelectric 
(14.6% of world trade), and electrical machinery nes (10.5% of world trade). Most 
of these sectors are prominent in supply chain links.
There are 46 sectors classified as primary goods, accounting for 5% of global 
trade flows and with an average GL5 index is of per cent. There are 38 sectors clas-
sified as final goods, accounting for 21% of global trade and with an average GL5 
index of 23.5%. There are 93 sectors classified as intermediate goods, accounting for 
74% of global trade and with an average GL5 index of 24.2%. Using this distinction 
as a basis for identifying supply chains is less useful because intermediate goods 
account for most trade flows and together with final goods for almost all trade flows, 
while the GL5 index is quite similar for intermediate and final goods, and the latter 
category includes prominent supply chain sectors (like cars and aircraft) which one 
would not like to be excluded from the analysis. We therefore base our analysis on a 
detailed trade-weighted index at the country level.
Figure 11 shows the duration and value-added linkages for the recovered and not-
















Fig. 10  Global average Grubel–Lloyd index per 3-digit sector at 5-digit level, per cent. Source: Created 
using Brülhart (2008) data for 2006 at SITC (3rd rev) 5-digit level; bubbles proportional to the size of 
global trade flows; 177 sectors; nes = not elsewhere specified; el pwr mach is electrical power machines; 
global trade weighted average is 31.9%; 3-digit sector BEC product grouping used
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Fig. 11  Duration and value-added linkages; recovered and not-yet recovered countries. Source: Authors’s 
calculations; 55 countries included; linkages are trade-weighted; global trade share of recovered coun-
tries is relative to group of 55 countries
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Heterogeneous country responses to the Great Recession: the…
Table 9  Control variables for Table 5 on backward and forward linkages. Source: Authors’s calculations, 
see Table 5 for details
ln(income)/ln(inc) log income per capita, ln(trade) log trade size, ln(pop) log population size, p value in 
parentheses
p values *0.1 significance, **0.05 significance, ***0.01 significance
a Ignores information on countries which have not yet recovered; see Sect. 6 for survival analysis
(a) Backward- and forward linkages jointly; controls
Variable ln(income) ln(trade) ln(pop)
Timing (year)
 Peak − 0.0140 (0.910) − 0.0545 (0.271) 0.0918* (0.0957)
 Trough 0.0848 (0.251) − 0.0204 (0.488) − 0.0114 (0.725)
 Recoverya 0.931 (0.181) − 0.0832 (0.765) − 0.134 (0.645)
 Size (%) − 0.765 (0.683) − 0.473 (0.528) − 0.288 (0.727)
Duration (months)
 Decline 1.185 (0.532) 0.410 (0.589) − 1.238 (0.142)
 Recoverya 11.02 (0.176) − 1.113 (0.732) − 1.224 (0.719)
 Totala 27.66*** (0.006) − 2.476 (0.519) 0.0768 (0.986)
Speed (% per month)
 Decline − 0.312 (0.137) − 0.0475 (0.568) 0.140 (0.130)
 Recoverya − 0.497** (0.025) 0.0548 (0.529) 0.0413 (0.649)
(b) Backward-, forward, and total-linkages separately; controls
Variable Backward Forward Total
ln(inc) ln(trade) ln(pop) ln(inc) ln(trade) ln(pop) ln(inc) ln(trade) ln(pop)
Timing (years)
 Peak 0.0065 − 0.0533 0.096* − 0.014 − 0.054 0.090* 0.0127 − 0.057 0.110**
(0.958) (0.286) (0.084) (0.910) (0.271) (0.096) (0.918) (0.252) (0.042)
 Trough 0.0877 − 0.0202 − 0.0108 0.0847 − 0.0206 − 0.0108 0.0923 − 0.0212 − 0.0062
(0.227) (0.488) (0.736) (0.247) (0.479) (0.733) (0.204) (0.469) (0.844)
 Recov-
erya
1.004 − 0.0998 − 0.114 0.997 − 0.107 − 0.141 0.874 − 0.0825 − 0.184
(0.140) (0.716) (0.690) (0.150) (0.699) (0.626) (0.203) (0.765) (0.514)
Size (%) − 0.945 − 0.484 − 0.325 − 0.757 − 0.453 − 0.344 − 1.325 − 0.415 − 0.678
(0.610) (0.517) (0.692) (0.684) (0.542) (0.673) (0.486) (0.589) (0.411)
Duration (months)
 Decline 0.975 0.397 − 1.281 1.182 0.401 − 1.213 0.955 0.433 − 1.398*
(0.603) (0.599) (0.127) (0.529) (0.593) (0.144) (0.608) (0.566) (0.087)
 Recov-
erya
11.75 − 1.279 − 1.029 11.77 − 1.387 − 1.312 10.24 − 1.103 − 1.899
(0.139) (0.690) (0.758) (0.147) (0.668) (0.699) (0.204) (0.734) (0.565)
 Totala 25.9*** − 2.582 − 0.281 27.6*** − 2.617 0.478 26.7*** − 2.377 − 0.596
(0.009) (0.506) (0.947) (0.005) (0.494) (0.909) (0.006) (0.533) (0.884)
Speed (% per month)
 Decline − 0.288 − 0.0460 0.145 − 0.310 − 0.0420 0.125 − 0.35* − 0.0441 0.117
(0.166) (0.580) (0.116) (0.144) (0.618) (0.180) (0.097) (0.596) (0.191)
 Recov-
erya
− 0.52** 0.0607 0.0343 − 0.50** 0.0570 0.0420 − 0.51** 0.0549 0.0290
(0.016) (0.480) (0.702) (0.021) (0.505) (0.639) (0.020) (0.524) (0.740)
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